

Organisational Culture of UN Agencies: The Need for Diplomats to Manage Porous Boundary Phenomena

By Raymond Saner & Lichia Yiu

published in “Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy”, edited by H.Slavik,
DiploFoundation, Malta, Geneva, 2004. pp.241-252

Diplomacy Dialogue, Geneva c/o CSEND
saner@csend.org & yiui@csend.org
<http://diplomacydialogue.org>

Abstract:

Diplomats responsible for interfacing with UN Agencies need to recognise and manage overt and covert aspects of the Organisational Culture of UN Agencies, which are distinct from mainstream public and private sector organisations. Particular features of UN organisational cultures for instance often consist of complex informal organisational structures, multiple political interference's (external and internal), inter-cultural value differences of staff and different management practices. Porous Boundary Phenomena from the authors' point of view is one of the major factors which impose constraints on the performance of UN and in itself mirrors the client system that the UN is serving. While diplomats use the UN system as one of the major fora for negotiations and coordination, they also monitor and try to guide the direction of the UN system. Hence, diplomats need to understand the specific organisational characteristics of the UN Agencies, i.e., the porous boundary phenomenon, and learn how to manage the interface with UN organisational culture in a mutually beneficial manner.

Key words: Diplomats, United Nations, Porous Boundary, and Organisational dynamics

INTRODUCTION

Diplomats assigned to UN Agencies face challenges, which are peculiar to the UN system. Acting as the stakeholders of the UN System and at the same time representing member states, diplomats need to learn how to navigate through the complicated UN systems and its various informal arrangements in order to safeguard the interests of individual member states and at the same time in order to achieve collaboration in dealing with interdependent needs, such as preventive diplomacy¹, trade, public health, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, environment and development cooperation. Besides having to face inter-cultural complexity in their exchanges with UN staff coming from almost all possible cultural backgrounds, the diplomats also need to understand the different organisational cultures of UN Agencies which are distinct and not comparable with any other private or public sector organisations.

The goal of this article is to introduce readers to the complexity of the organisational culture of UN Agencies in order to limit possible misunderstandings about the functioning of the UN and its Agencies and in order to make diplomats' interactions with UN Agencies as efficient and as effective as possible. Indirectly, it is hoped that this article could also contribute, however slightly; to the successful functioning of the UN community and offer support for the mutually beneficial collaboration of nations and the identification of successful solutions to meet shared global concerns.

UNITED NATIONS - THE CONTEXT

The UN Family

In September 2002, the UN system consisted of 191 member states in September 2002. It comprises six core bodies: the General Assembly, the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice. In addition, the UN system has 14 specialised agencies and 12 funds and programmes. Collectively, there are about 56,000 staff of which nearly 22,000 occupy professional positions in the UN workforce.²

The 15 UN organisations apply a common system of salaries and pensions³ (excluding WB.IDA.IFC and IMF) and employ people assigned to over 170 countries, working at some 600 different places throughout the world and using six major official languages. 52 % of UN staff work for the UN secretariat and its programmes. The remaining 48 % are employed by the 15 specialised or related agencies such as the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO, WHO, World Bank, IDA, IFC, IMF, ICAO, UPU, ITU, WMO, IMCO, WIPO and IFAD. These Agencies report annually to the Economic and Social Council in New York.

¹ A concept first put forward by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* to the Security Council in 1992 as a more effective approach for the UN to mediate humanitarian crises.

² Fred Gedrich, "Freedom Alliance Exposes UN Hiring Practices: UN Commissars Continue Anti-American Bias in Staffing UN Jobs," *Freedom Alliance Issue Brief* 2001-07 (September 2001), 2.

³ Terry Slater, "UN Personnel Policies Support World Body's Unique Organizational Values," *Public Personnel Management* 21, 3 (Fall 1992), 383-84

These intergovernmental Agencies are separate, autonomous organisations related to the UN by special agreements. They collaborate with the UN and with each other through the coordinating machinery of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Their secretariats, composed of international staff representing over 170 different nationalities, work under the direction of the executive head of the respective agencies. Their functions are to provide either a forum for negotiations and decisions (e.g. international conventions regarding trade, labour, human rights etc.) or specific services (e.g. health, institution building, agricultural development etc.).

The Charter describes the Secretary General as "Chief administrative officer" of the Organisation, who shall act in that capacity and perform "such other functions as are entrusted" to him/her by the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC and other UN organs. UN Charter also empowers the Secretary General to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matters which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". These guidelines both define the power of SG's office and its scope of action.

However, the interpretation of the role of the SG is very much dependent on the incumbent of the office. It could range from being an administrator to a more dynamic and innovative interpretation of his role. The current SG, for example, sees himself assuming a combined role with equal parts assigned to being a diplomat and an advocate, a civil servant and a CEO, and being a symbol of United Nations ideals and a spokesman for the interest of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and the vulnerable among them⁴. The different perception of what the role and responsibility of SG lays another source of potential tension between the Organisation, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Criticisms and On-going Reforms

In this world of renewed and growing conflicts, some countries expressed their misgiving about the role of the UN and in particular of its Security Council. Disagreements sharpened between key countries before the invasion of Iraq by the USA and its allies. In particular, the functioning of the Security Council was severely criticised and the future of the UN was put into question by some leading officials of the US government who expressed unhappiness about the multilateral decision making process in general and the accompanying rules and conventions in particular.

Leaving the Iraq war and the related conflict between important countries aside, few are those who would want to abolish the very existence of the UN system with all its many specialised agencies and accompanying multilateral treaties. Most countries prefer the multilateral UN system with all its imperfections to a situation based on unilateral dominance or bilateral confrontations. It is up to the member countries that exercise oversight and governance over the UN system to make it work to the benefit of the total membership.

While the large majority of the current UN members prefer continuity of multilateralism, many countries nevertheless have also expressed their wish to see efficiency and effectiveness be improved within the UN system. Criticism and concerns were raised about various perceived shortcomings of the UN system and its ineffective performance, especially when dealing with humanitarian crises and specifically inter-racial/communal armed conflicts⁵. Criticism was also raised in regard to UN

⁴ UN Department of Public Information, *The Role of the Secretary General*. United Nations (2000) (website); available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/pgaes/sg_office.html

⁵ Secretary General, Kofi Annan, would be the first to acknowledge that UN failed to respond effectively in some of the recent atrocities in places such as Rwanda (1994) or Bosnia (1995). He published two tough reports on the

Agencies' lack of reform of their swollen bureaucracies ⁶ or being slow in responding to the needs in the field ⁷, and even more grave accusation of fraud and abuse ⁸ within some of its specialised agencies.

Reforming of the UN system has been an ongoing process since the 1980's focusing on budgetary, management, or structural issues. US in particular and other Western industrialised countries have pushed for budgetary and management reforms with visible success while the more complicated institutional changes remain limited and harder to accomplish.

Faced with the uncertainty induced by the attacks on the World Trade Towers (9/11/2001) and the Iraq War and the twin processes of global integration and local fragmentation, the UN is even more important than ever before in regard to its role of offering global governance structures and facilitating social and economic development around the world. Yet without a mandate to regulate neither the world affairs nor the control of independent resources, UN's capacity to intervene, especially during times of crisis, remains rather limited.

In the words of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, "if the UN is to effectively realize its global mission of furthering peace, development and human rights, it must manage its human resources better". He further stated, "We are too complicated and too slow. We are over-administered and have too many rules and too many regulations". Calling for more investment in staff, simpler procedures and more authority for managers, the Secretary General said that the reforms he proposed were designed to ensure that the UN could have "the right people with the right skills in the right job at the right time"⁹.

What was less said is that the complex operational environment of the UN system is embedded in a situation, which consists of divergent interest, power blocks, complicated interaction patterns and contrasting worldviews. The UN is not only a system of service providers but at times is called upon to be an arbitrator between competing factions without vested power to do so. Diplomats representing member countries have an important role to play to support the Secretary General in achieving the challenging goals of strengthening the capacity to perform and in addition to co-creating an enabling environment for UN to carry its duties.

ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE OF UN

Multilayers of Political Influence

Srebrenica and Rwanda massacre with forthright frankness. Besides acknowledging the responsibility of UN Peacekeeping Department, these reports also implicated the Security Council in its woeful lack of quick and active responses to clear signs that horrendous catastrophes were in the making.

⁶ "United Nations: Challenge for The New Boss," *Time*, 3 February 1992, 28-29

⁷ *Financial Times*, "Hurd promises increased EC aid to Somalia," 5-6 September 1992.

⁸ Zarrin Caldwell, U.S. Policy and U.N. Reform: Past, Present, and Future [website]; available at <http://www.unausa.org/publications/reformfs.asp>

⁹ United Nations (A/53/414/1998), "*Human Resource Management Reform: Report of the Secretary General*," United Nations General Assembly, New York, 13 October 1998.

Public management and public organisations are characterised by distinct features differing from the private sector companies. The most commonly known aspects have been summarised by Rainey (1991) namely: reliance on governmental appropriations for financial resources, presence of intensive formal legal constraints, presence of intensive external political influences and greater goal ambiguity, multiplicity and conflict.¹¹

The UN system functions with similar characteristics. Each specialised UN Agency has its own decision making body involving a multitude of governments and related constituencies, which together approve annual budgets and influence the major directions of the Agencies' programmes and activities. Hence, the decision-making process can be very complex and presents in itself major obstacles regarding clarity of purpose; effectiveness and efficiency of management and unity of staff¹². These constraints are even more pronounced within the workings of UN Secretariat where international "political" dossiers are negotiated and dealt with.

The budgetary process determines the resource allocation to different programmes and hence member states have keen interest in influencing the outcome through different forms of manoeuvring. Alliances building within the diplomatic communities and within the UN secretariat and Agencies become critical especially for the small nations, which rely on UN appropriation for their national development.

At the personnel level, UN staff, although bound by the UN rule of neutrality¹³, are supposed to stay above the political manoeuvring. However, this has not always been the case. Mixed loyalties toward the UN system and one's own home country are almost inevitable since many member countries influence their own nationals' posting within the UN system and promote their own nationals' career paths. However, personal and national interests alone cannot fully explain why the UN is a complex system with sub-optimal performance. Additional understanding is needed in order to find ways to strengthen this important institution.

At the Organisational level, the UN system is constantly under pressure to fulfil the wishes of its paymasters and constituencies. Sandwiched between the Security Council (akin to a cabinet of nations led by the five permanent members) and the Member States (shareholders), the Secretariat and the UN system are evaluated both based on the political criteria and actual performance in discharging its responsibilities. International politics are played out in the UN arena. As a result, mirroring its membership, at times of crisis, the UN is locked up by policy paralysis and power struggle. Diplomats, inadvertently become part of the problem when executing the national will at the expense of collaboration for common good.

At the grassroots level, non-state actors have been allowed, albeit gingerly, into the international policy arena of the UN. Increasingly vocal and self-assured, trans-national NGOs and other self-styled

¹¹ Hal Rainey, *Understanding and managing public organizations* (Jossey-Bass Publisher, 1991), 33

¹² Eugene Sochor, "Decision-making in the International Civil Aviation Organization: politics, processes and personalities," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 55 (1989), 241-59. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization* 53, 4 (Autumn 1999), 699-732. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55, 4 (Autumn 2001), 761-799

¹³ As international civil servants, staff members and the Secretary General answer to the UN alone for their activities, and take an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or outside authority. On the other hand, under the Charter each Member State undertakes to refrain from seeking to influence the staff and the Secretary General improperly in the discharge of their duties

militant groups have yielded considerable influence on the international policy, at times even greater than some of the Member States. They are promoting their agenda through active participation in the UN system and by providing service delivery for development and/or humanitarian purposes.¹⁴ This third sector, representing transborder *and* communal/grassroots interests, have enlivened the international policy debates, but also added to the already complex process of multilateral decision-making process. Diplomats, as well as UN officials, are pushed to recognise the legitimacy of non-state actors presence in their so to speak "home" turf and to learn how to live with such post-modern reality.

Internal Fragmentation and Coordination Barriers

Internally, UN system has been confronted with coordination difficulties for decades. For instance, some UN Agencies might compete with each other to be given specific mandates ¹⁵ or they have overlapping mandates and opt not to coordinate, as they should ¹⁶. Overlapping and competing programmes among different agencies remains a reality despite best efforts to eliminate such wastefulness over the last twenty years. However, this sub-optimal performance of the UN should not only be attributed to the structural origin, but should also be understood from an organisational behaviour perspective.

The inter-Agency coordination has been difficult due to the fact that there remains low system cohesion within UN family resulting in mini-kingdoms and/or serfdoms. There are often layers of "class or prestige" ¹⁷ gaps between various levels of management. In addition, there are sometimes also functional gaps between working units of UN Agencies. If horizontally layered management gaps are superimposed on vertical functional gaps, so called "operational islands" (analogous to Figure 1) below might have emerged which refuse to communicate with one another for fear that giving up information may strengthen their "opponents" and reduce their own power base. Duplication of functions and programmes is but one manifestation of this internal fragmentation.


¹⁴ The rising public policy and diplomatic role of the transnational NGOs has been discussed in the article by Saner, R and Yiu, L. in "International Economic Diplomacy: Mutations in Post-Modern Times", *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, No. 84 (January 2003). Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, The Hague.

¹⁵ A case in point here was the fight between the ILO and UNICEF in regard to child labour.

¹⁶ The current Doha Round of the WTO requires capacity building for least developed countries. Despite ample attempts to coordinate programmes, the World Bank, UNDP and UNCTAD remain insufficiently coordinate to the detriment of the LDCs.

¹⁷ Harold Kerzner, *Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling and Controlling* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co, 1984).

Fragmentation & Organisational Islands



© CSEND, 2003. www.csend.org

Figure 1: Organisational Islands
(adapted from Harold Kerzner, 1984)

Similar rift exists at the intra-organisational dimension. There is insufficient management control to harness a more cohesive culture and operations. Many UN Agencies do not have a functioning performance appraisal system nor career plans or merit systems. Depending on power shifts, managers are reassigned to posts without necessarily possessing the required professional expertise. On the other hand, UN Agencies cannot easily dismiss their staff. Hence there exists a strong conflict between relative job security and a sense of insecurity based on persistent uncertainty regarding job posting and career prospects. Both factors combined encourage patronage, which in turn is reinforced by the multicultural divisions within the staff of UN Agencies, which in turn reinforces "patronage-tribalism" and exasperating the problem of coordination further.

Individual "fiefdoms" have also been prone to curry favours with specific constituencies. Such alliances building one the one hand consolidates one's hold on power, on the other it further erodes the already permeable boundary of the UN system.

Weak and Porous Organisational Boundaries

Continuous external pressures on financial and political decisions in conjunction with complex decision-making processes and entrance of non-conventional actors weaken organisational boundaries and open the UN Agencies to the power plays of multiple external and internal constituencies. To understand this phenomenon, Henry Mintzberg (1984) developed a typology of configurations of organisational power and proposed one possible relationship between external and internal coalitions, which the authors considers fits best the context of the UN system. He very concisely stated:

"A divided external coalition encourages the rise of politicised internal coalition, and vice versa".²¹

The board members of UN Agencies, namely the various member governments, have been and continue to be divided over general as well as particular issues. The most apparent divisions occurred during the cold war period. The current division's centres on the North-South divide, trade block conflicts, and on particular issue-by-issue conflicts, whatever is at stake at the particular moment for the governments concerned.

Member governments exert pressures leading heads of UN Agencies and vice versa. The respective director generals use their political weapons to counterattack real or perceived threats to their power and re-election. De Cooker (1990), who citing various secondary sources reports, gives an example of such manoeuvres:

"Mr. Saoma, the head of FAO is accused of having politicized and mismanaged his organisation, of practising coercive and terrorist tactics and to run a reign of terror in the secretariat... In addition to the US, the UK, Australia and Canada have suspended further payments to the organisation pending budget reforms. These countries are applying financial blackmail to the organisation, in order to obtain the right to approve or veto its budget level..."²²

This continuous building and shifting of coalitions weakens the decision-making process of UN Agencies and causes negative consequences in regard to staff cohesion and internal functioning. UN Agencies' external boundaries remain weak, porous and continuously open to manipulations by multiple interest groups and stakeholders, while internally boundaries could be rigid making it difficult to engage in constructive teamwork and inter-departmental collaboration.

The tendency towards external and internal coalition building is further heightened by the multi-national and multi-cultural composition of the UN staff, which represent a rich linguistic, national, religious and cultural mixture. This build-in diversity and psychological and cultural distance can create ambiguities in regard to staff loyalty and identification, which in turn can further increase the likelihood of conflict and coalition building. Under ideal circumstances, those working for the bureaucracy should be politically neutral, recruited on the basis of merit, and subject to

"Uniform standards regarding conditions of employment, but in reality the international civil servants are subject, like their national counterparts, to the political conditions of their environment".²³

Yet, the conflict regarding loyalty is built into the system by two articles of the UN Charter, which unintendedly has led to tension and conflict. Article 100 reminds international servants not to seek nor receive instructions from any government or other authorities external to the UN organisation. It also

²¹ Henry Mintzberg, "Power and Organisation Life Cycles," *Academy of Management Review* 9, 2 (1984) 207-24.

²² Chris De Cooker, *Law and Management Practices in International Organizations* (Martinus Nijhoff Publ. and UNITAR, 1990), II. 4/8.

²³ Robert Jordan, "The Fluctuating Fortunes of the United Nations International Civil Service: Hostage to Politics or Undeservedly Criticised?," *Public Administrative Review* 51, 4 (July/August 1991).

reminds member states not to influence the staff and to respect the international character of their work and responsibility. Article 101 on the other hand, while not putting into question Article 100, asks for due geographical distribution of the UN staff. Both articles have been actively resisted at times by main member states for different reasons.²⁵

Leadership Challenge and Accountability

Continuous changes in its external environment combined with possible reactive or even proactive shiftiness of its internal environment have made UN Agencies an especially difficult if not challenging place for leadership and management control. Figure 2 depicts a situation building on the previous “operational islands” concept but showing also the multitudes of influencing vectors reaching into a typical UN Agency from outside at practically all levels of hierarchy while at the same time vectors of influencing are emanating from within a UN Agency aiming at influencing stakeholders outside of the organisation.

Fragmentation & Porousness

(Saner & Yiu, 2002, “Porous Boundaries & Power Politics”)




Figure 2: Influencing Vectors passing through Porous Boundaries

Any attempt to reform current organisational practice in such a volatile environment has to face many forms of open and subtle resistances. Laurance Geri (2001) has reported successful organisational change at the World Health Organisation (WHO) but overall failure is common. Small successes give

²⁵ For instance, based on President Truman's Executive Order 10,422 of 1952, US citizens used to have to undergo full field security investigations before being "cleared" for work in the UN organisations. This political control has since then been abolished.

raise to a consultant's celebration but overall the task of reform in UN Agencies often appears to be of a "Sysiphonian" nature.²⁶

WHAT IS "POROUS BOUNDARY" PHENOMENA?

When interacting with UN Agencies, a foreign diplomat might feel confused about the seemingly fuzzy reality of organisational life in most UN Agencies. In contrast to clear lines of command and clear boundaries in regard to roles and responsibilities common in most private sector enterprises and most public administrations, a picture presents itself which we best describe as an organisational culture resulted from "Porous Boundaries".

"Porous Boundaries" impact different aspects of organisational life. It helps to explain some of the performance issues confronting the UN system, although different agencies suffer from this phenomenon to varying degrees. Table 1 provides an overview of the organisational profile with porous boundaries.²⁷

Table 1: Definition of "Porous Boundaries"

Stake holders:	Multitude of actors, e.g. governments, NGO's, inter-governmental institutions, who compete over use of financial and human resources of the organisation.
Leadership:	Elected or reinstated by members of governing body through process of bargaining and coalition building. Elected leadership enjoying relative autonomy during times of power parity in between budget cycles.
Goals:	Negotiated compromises often remaining ambiguous in order to satisfy the needs and objectives of the stakeholders.
Financial Resources:	Result of bargaining process, often approved, rejected, altered or amended on a yearly basis.
Human Resources:	Recruitment based on official or unofficial quota system. Standards adjusted to accommodate divergent competence levels of international staff.
Organisation:	Hierarchical, dominance of legal and bureaucratic measures as a defence against shifting alliances and external pressures.

²⁶ Laurance Geri, "New Public Management and The Reform of International Organizations," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 67 (2001), 445-460.

²⁷ Description of porous boundaries first appeared in the work of Rainey (1991), Sochor (1989) and Mintzberg (1984). More recently, the authors expanded this concept to describe the unique organisational culture of UN. For more detailed overview of "Porous Boundaries" see: Raymond Saner, Lichia Yiu; "Porous Boundaries and Power Politics: Contextual Constraints of Organisation Development Change Projects in the United Nations and related Intergovernmental Organisations," *Gestalt Review* 5,3 (2002).

Culture:	Traditional, non-innovative, defensive, security-minded, clanism combined with idealism resulting in frequent power fights.
-----------------	---

Confronted with these specific characteristics, it is surprising that UN Organisations have managed to deliver some outstanding achievements. For instance, the eradication of smallpox through a successful globalisation immunisation programme organised by the joint effort of UNICEF²⁸ and WHO; protection and restoration of heritage sites around the world by the UNESCO; to the on-going effort by the UN agencies to raise awareness of the Children and woman in war torn cities and other under developed regions of the world. Through the continuous effort and championship of the UN, plight of the vulnerable groups around the world have been brought to the consciousness of a general public who enjoy much higher standards of living. Concerted effort, under the umbrella of UNDP has brought infrastructure development in terms of water, transportation, health, education, and employment to different parts of the world arguably at times very slowly. Without a global infrastructure and the oversight of an international administration, these feats would not be easily accomplishable.

Conclusions

UN Agencies are needed and so is the United National system. While this is obvious to most people, fewer people agree on what these agencies should do and how they should be organised and managed. The need for their continued efficient and effective existence is not in doubt but as Geri (2001) states:

“International Organisations and their public stakeholders must protect their capacity to provide critical collective goods or their value to global society will be seriously compromised.”²⁹

This point is amply demonstrated with the current SARS crisis around the world. Without WHO's global Response and Alert Network, it would be difficult to imagine that a coordinated effort connecting different parts of the world could be mobilised to try to contain the further spreading of the SARS virus. To entrust this task for instance solely to one national health centre, for instance to the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, would not be feasible politically nor effective from an operational perspective.

While being very important if not irreplaceable for the international community, the UN organisations also have to adapt and adjust to new environments and engage their member countries in constructive and efficient interactions. However, due to the multiple stakeholders involved, the organisational environment of UN Agencies is and will be politicised for the foreseeable future. Hence, the "porous boundary" phenomena described above will continue for a long time.

As mandates and tasks of the UN system increase almost day by day, the need for efficient management and an effective organisation is of paramount importance to all parties involved. Ways to

²⁸ More information on this, please check www.unicef.org/about/timeline.html

²⁹ Geri., 458.

improve existing and future UN Agencies' performance will be needed on a consistent and continuous basis. At the same time, foreign diplomats assigned to cover a UN Agency should be mindful that undue external influencing and political pressures would further aggravate the Porous Boundary phenomenon endangering the long-term survival of the UN system. What is needed for the benefit of all parties concerned is a reduction of Porous Boundary phenomenon and a strengthening of the UN systems' organisational structure and processes through more collaborative arrangements between member states and through the good office of the diplomat who facilitate the dialogue between their capitals and the UN system.

AUTHORS

Dr. Raymond Saner

Dr Raymond Saner teaches at the Centre of Economics and Business Administration of the University of Basle, Switzerland, and is also a Director of the Centre for Socio-Eco-Nomic Development in Geneva, Switzerland, a NGRDO focusing on socio-economic research and reform in the public sector. As an expert in organisation development, he has designed capacity building programmes for UN Agencies and Donor governments in developing and transition economies and implemented management reform projects for UN Agencies (ILO, UNICEF, UNDEP). Much of his research, publishing and consulting work in the field of conflict resolution focus on multilateral diplomacy and training in negotiation competence for diplomats and international civil servants. (*The Expert Negotiator*³⁰, 1997, *International Economic Diplomacy*³¹, 2003).

Dr. Lichia Yiu

Dr. Lichia Yiu works with UN organisations and national governments on building internal capacities for transformation and performance improvement. She also works with multinational companies on issues related to developing trans-national leadership, building cross-border teams for technological innovation and on business development in emerging markets. Her current research interests are human capital formation and quality of training and education, chaos and complexity theory and its application to large social system change, business diplomacy and multi-stakeholder relationships, and global leadership. She is faculty member of the NGO Management Department of the National Cheng-chi University of Taipei, President of the Centre for Socio-Eco-Nomic Development in Geneva, Switzerland and Partner of Organisational Consultants Ltd. Hong Kong. She has published 7 books and 40 articles.

³⁰ Raymond Saner, *The Expert Negotiator* (The Hague, Kluwer Law Publisher, 2000).

³¹ Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu, Lichia "*International Economic Diplomacy: Mutations in Post-modern Times*," Discussion Paper XXX, Clingendael Institute of International Relations, The Hague, 2003.