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CYPRUS CONFLICT: WILL IT EVER END IN AGREEMENT?

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this chapter is to describe factors, which have contributed to the persistent failures of peace negotiations on Cyprus. In particular, the author attempts to delineate the impact which multiple and competing external stakeholders (influential foreign powers, supranational institutions, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs from various countries) have had on the peace process and how these third parties (first level GR and TR, secondary level USA, UK, EU and UNO) have used the Cyprus conflict for their own strategic aims and secondary gains by offering their influence to the two conflict parties (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). As a result of these ongoing external stakeholders interferences, the Cyprus conflict has persisted and negotiation behavior of the primary conflict parties became characterized by opportunistic tactical maneuvers prolonging and deepening non-agreement ever since the peace enforcing presence of UN forces on the island starting in 1974 and lasting up to the writing of this article.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF CYPRUS CONFLICT 2002-JANUARY 2006 ^{1,2}

In January 2002, direct talks under the auspices of Secretary-General Annan began between Republic of Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides (Greek community) and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash (Turkish Community). In November 2002, UN Secretary-General Annan released a comprehensive plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It was revised in early December. In the lead up to the European Union's December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, intensive efforts were made to gain both sides' signatures to the document prior to a decision on the island's EU membership. Neither side agreed to sign. The EU invited the Republic of Cyprus to join on 16th December 2002.

Following the Copenhagen Summit, the UN continued dialogue with the two sides with the goal of reaching a settlement prior to Cyprus's signature of the EU accession treaty on 16th April 2003. A third version of the Annan plan was put to the parties in February 2003. That same month the Secretary-General again visited the island and asked that both leaders agree to put the plan to referendum in their respective communities. Also in February 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos was elected as the fifth president of the Republic of Cyprus. On 10th March 2003, this most recent phase of talks collapsed in The Hague, Netherlands, when Denktash told the Secretary-General he would not put the Annan Plan to referendum.

In February 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktash accepted the Secretary-General's invitation to resume negotiations on a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. After

¹ Even though openly in favor of many positions put forward by Northern Cyprus, Dodd (1999) offers a very good summary of previous attempts at conflict resolution on Cyprus.

² Within the period of 1964-1994, the United Nations passed 17 statements and letters by the UN Secretary General, 93 Security Council Resolutions, 13 UN General Assembly resolutions, 6 UN reports by the Commission on Human Rights (Source: “Resolutions Adopted by the UN on Cyprus Problem,” published by the Press and Information Office of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia)

meeting with Annan in New York, talks began on-island on 19th February 2004. The two community leaders, Rauf Denkash and Tassos Papadopoulos, met nearly every day for negotiations facilitated by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto. In addition, numerous technical committees and subcommittees met in parallel in an effort to resolve outstanding issues. When this stage of the talks failed to reach an agreed settlement Rauf Dentaksh refused to attend the next stage of meetings which were scheduled to take place in Bürgenstock on 24th March 2004 and sent Mehmet Ali Talat and Serder Denkash as his agents. The talks collapsed and the two communities reached no negotiated agreement. The Secretary-General then stepped in as arbitrator and on 31st March presented to the two sides a proposed final settlement. Rauf Dentaksh rejected Annan's proposal immediately and Tassos Papadopoulos rejected the plan a week later while Mehmet Ali Talat supported it.

The plan was placed before the two communities in a simultaneous vote in the reunification referendum of 24th April 2004. Whilst the proposal received a 65% favourable vote from the Turkish community, the Greek Cypriot community rejected it by three to one. Since implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, reunification did not take place. Had there been a positive vote on both sides, a unified Cyprus would have acceded to the European Union on 1st May 2004 instead Cyprus joined the EU without the northern part populated by the Turkish Cypriots.

Since then, low key talks have started again between the newly appointed UN Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Mr. Kieran Prendergast and leaders of both communities and on 16th June 2005, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1604, thus renewing the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further six months, until 15 December 2005 and EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn appointed Jaakko Blomberg, former Finish envoy to Cyprus, as EU Commission special adviser on Cyprus in June 2005.³

On 3 October 2005, membership negotiations were symbolically opened with Turkey, which has been an associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. The historic decision on 17 December 2004 by the European Council was confirmed by the European heads of state and government on 17 June. On 29 June 2005, the Commission presented its negotiating framework to Ankara, and after a full day of intense negotiations the EU-25's foreign ministers finalised the document on 3 October 2005. Within hours, Turkey accepted the terms.

Amid a flurry of controversy over Turkey's action plan' on Cyprus, the UN has announced its intention to start a new round of Cyprus peace talks in May 2006. This came about after the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for a meeting on the Cyprus conflict to be held "in May or June 2006" with the participation of representatives from Turkey, Greece and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

Meanwhile, Kofi Annan's spokesman George Lillikas has said that the UN will resume its peace efforts in Cyprus after the May 2006 parliamentary elections in the Republic of Cyprus. "Our effort is to avoid a hasty new process of negotiations, which would fail in no time," said Lillikas.

³ From the perspective of many Southern Cyprus officials, the UN was keeping peace but not making peace. The presence of UNFICYP prevented an outbreak of new violence but indirectly sanctioned the occupation of parts of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces. From the perspective of many Northern Cyprus officials, the UN failed to protect the Turkish minorities in 1960-1974 and through its refusal to extend political recognition to Northern Cyprus, the UN failed to act as a neutral third party.

In its action plan revealed on 24 January 2006, Ankara has said that it would open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot carriers on condition that they reciprocally end restrictions on Turkish Cypriots. The initiative was welcomed by the EU, the US and the UN, but it was immediately rejected by Greek President Tassos Papadopoulos and the Greek Cypriot leaders as a rehashing of earlier inconclusive proposals.

In the same breath, the Greek leaders also criticized British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw for his whistle-stop meeting with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat. Reacting to Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn's statement that "the Commission welcomes efforts to achieve progress" in the current Cyprus deadlock, Nicosia has lodged an official complaint with the Commission, questioning whether Rehn was in a position to express the Commission's support for the latest Turkish 'action plan' before the Commission had actually considered the initiative.⁴

UN Undersecretary General Ibrahim Gambari visited Cyprus on 6-9 July 2006, held talks with Mr. Papadopoulos and Mr. Talat. Secretary General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Michael Moller, is supposed to continue with discussions between both parties and the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNFICP for another six months beyond 15th December 2006 (SC Resolution 1728). Hence, all looks set for another round of informal talks, quasi negotiations, initiatives etc. with uncertain outcome for all parties concerned but with a nagging wink along the proverbial French proverb which says: *plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose*. The future will tell what will be possible.

PROBLEMATIC CAUSE-EFFECT TIME LINE OF CYPRUS CONFLICT

While most scholars agree that the Cyprus conflict is one of the longest lasting continuous international conflicts, few can agree as to when the conflict started hence there is no agreement on the timeline. For many experts and scholars, the international Cyprus conflict started with the attempted coup in 1974 by Greek Cypriot Sampson against then president Makarios. Sampson's violent coup was supported by the then military junta in power in Greece with the aim of achieving ENOSIS (unification of Cyprus with Greece). This attempted overthrow of the Cypriot government led subsequently to the military interference by Turkey, one of the guarantor states of newly independent Cyprus, ostensibly to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from possible violent acts by the majority Greek communities without though retreating to Turkey ever since.⁵

⁴The Institute of Multi-Tack Diplomacy (IMTD), Washington DC, and the Conflict Management Group (CMG), Cambridge Mass, joint forces under the name "Cyprus Consortium" to implement a training program in Cyprus focusing on conflict resolution, to build trust relationships and to demonstrate to their communities the potential for cooperation between the two sides of the conflict. (Notter, J, McDonald, J, 1998)

⁵Distinction needs to be made according to de iure and de facto use of terminology. According to UN practice, the Republic of Cyprus is the legitimate government representing the whole of the island while the TRNC has been declared legally invalid by the United Nations (Resolutions Nr. 541 (1983) and Nr. 550 (1984). The authors acknowledge the existing legal distinctions but for the sake of clarity and editorial expediency, de iure and de facto titles and denominations will be abstracted to Southern Cyprus (controlled by Republic of Cyprus) and Northern Cyprus (controlled by Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), and titles of heads of governments simplified to leader of Greek Cypriots (Mr. Clerides) and leader of Turkish Cypriots (Mr. Denktash).

What remains puzzling is the inactivity of the UK, the third guarantor nation of Cyprus. Greece being temporarily paralyzed by the collapse of the military junta and the return to democracy was in no position to intervene militarily on the island. This was not true in regard to the UK who had troops stationed on its two extraterritorial military bases. The military inactivity led to speculations as to the intention of the UK government and by extension of the USA which were recently rekindled by the release of the Callaghan report that seems to suggest that Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was intent not to intervene nor suggest intervention by the UK forces in order not to oppose Turkey's goodwill in relation to US policy in the area.⁶

The ensuing war and partition of the island led to the intervention of the UN who dispatched peace enforcing military forces (UNFICYP) stationed between the two sides along the so called green line dividing the island into Greek Cypriot controlled South and a Turkish Cypriot controlled North with both sides' military forces being supported by Turkish and Greek army units. The largest foreign force though being the Turkish army units stationed on the Northern part of the island since 1974 and ever since. Pointing out the discrepancy between the UN Force's success in keeping peace but on the other hand not being able to fulfill its mandate of "bringing a return to normal conditions", Evriviades & Bourantonis (1994) suggest that the UN peacemaking efforts were fundamentally flawed since it led to a freezing of a status quo on the island.

Some scholars attribute the cause of the 1974 violence and inability of both sides to peacefully reunite the two sides to earlier disputes and related violence. Diana Weston Markides (2001) for instance goes back to colonial rule by the UK and suggests that the inability of both communities and of the British administration to create functioning municipal administrations acceptable to both communities was a key factor of subsequent division of municipalities along ethnic lines leading further to a full break down of cooperation between both communities at central government level in 1963, only three years after Cyprus reached independence in 1960 from UK.

Until 1957, the main towns of Cyprus were run by councils elected on the basis of communally based proportional representation inevitably resulting in Greek-dominated bodies run by Greek Cypriot majors. With independence from Britain looming and facing a power imbalance at municipal level, some leading members of the Turkish Cypriot community requested that at the time of British withdrawal, Cyprus should be retro ceded to Turkey from Britain who took control of the island in 1878. The orders given to their respective Turkish Cypriot communities were to withdraw from any official participation in municipal administrations.

Other scholars suggest that causes to the conflict go much further back on the time line alluding for instance to the cruelties committed during the invasion and subsequent rule of the Ottoman empire, the various wars, sacking, pillaging through the period of the Christian crusades and the competition between the Venetian and Genovese colonial intrusions into the region.⁷ As Alvaro de Soto, previously UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Cyprus stated (2005):

⁶ Turkey and Greece have been reported to have received in 1992-93 alone 2,822 tanks, 1,084 armored combat vehicles, 303 large caliber artillery systems, 28 attack helicopters and 14 warships (source: Financial Times, 7 June 1994); in addition it was reported that the Clinton administration notified Congress of plans to deliver 14 frigates to Turkey and 11 frigates to Greece over the next two years in a package of sales and give-aways worth approximately \$250 million (Source: International Herald Tribune, 3 July 1998)

⁷ A stalemate based on the insights of the game theory strategem of the prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1985) which states that cooperation might be more realistically possible once both parties to a conflict

Regrettably, as Churchill said of the Balkans, Cyprus has more history than it can digest. Trying to capture what happened in a few paragraphs is the diplomatic equivalent of walking through a minefield. For the Turkish Cypriots, the problem began in 1963 when Greek Cypriots hijacked and tried to Hellenise Cyprus, undoing the partnership enshrined in the 1960 constitution, corralling them in a small number of villages out of fear for their lives. The Greek Cypriots tend to fast-forward to 1974 and say that the problem started with the Turkish invasion and continues with its occupation. As Oscar Wilde said, the truth is never pure and rarely simple.

Mr. De Soto speaks from experience as he has been at the centre of the most recent failure to reach an agreement culminating in April 2004 when the so-called Annan⁸ plan was accepted by 65% of the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by 75% of the Greek Cypriots.

Looking at the region from a historical point of view and reflecting on the wrangling for power over the territories of the former Ottoman empire by the UK, France, Russia and Greece and Turkey, it is very instructive to follow in more depth the conflicting strategic interests of the big powers around the time of the Lausanne conference 1922-23 (Goldstein, 2003). Taking this conference as an early indicator of what was to come later in regard to the Cyprus conflict, Goldstein's article gives a very good picture of how third parties can decisively influence the outcome of international negotiations.

Another frequently mentioned perspective is the one concerning the role of the EU. For instance Oliver Richmond (2005) suggests that the EU expected "to act as a catalyst for the settlement of the Cyprus problem without becoming a direct mediator" (p.100) but by allowing Cyprus to become member of the EU before reaching an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, "the EU effectively became a party to the conflict" (p 109).

Related to the above, fault has been attributed to the UN secretary general and his team of negotiators who lost their neutrality by making use of the UN mandate to act as arbitrator when faced with no agreement after the failed Būrgenstock negotiations in 2004. By imposing a "UN solution", authors close to the Greek Cypriot position declared the UN mission of good office as a debacle (Palley, 2005). While such observation is worthy a longer discussion, attacking experts of the UN team as being of dubious intention reveals the suspiciousness and animosity, which have always characterized the Cyprus negotiations.⁹

Finally, observations have been made about the fact that both sides to the conflict enjoy higher GDP per capita than their respective mother lands (Saner & Yiu, 2002). This could be due to the ingenuity and hard work of the two communities. It could also be due to the fact that both sides receive support from Greece and Turkey respectively and from third parties such as the UN (e.g. UNDP) and bilateral donors. Long lasting conflicts tend to

realize that a win/lose strategy would start a mutually destructive lose/lose war. This strategem however is based on the assumption that players are conducting decision-making processes based on logical and reasonable cost-benefit analysis, an assumption, which requires the control of emotional behavior, which most observers of the region do not take for granted.

⁸ Hardy and Phillips (1998: 218) observed that dominant stakeholders may want to ensure that the domain definition does not change. Domain being defined as processes of social construction and meaning creation wherein social order is being negotiated by key stakeholders.

⁹ See Boatwain and Nicolson (1989) which describes the historical misgivings held by many Greeks based on the period of Greece's rule by the Ottoman empire.

attract parallel economies (Wennmann, 2005) and result in duplication of governmental structures, which in turn require additional resources of sometimes dubious origin.

ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

When mentioning the Cyprus conflict, most often allusion is made to the inter-communal conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots going back to pre-independence times as described in previous section. However, due to the fact that three guarantor countries (UK, Turkey, Greece) have the constitutional right to intervene unilaterally if seen needed, the intercommunal conflict was immediately lifted up to the level of conventional war (e.g. Turkey's landing of troops on the island in 1974 leading to war with the forces of the official Cypriot government¹⁰. In addition, subsequent to the conventional war between official Cyprus and Turkey, the Security Council of the UN following multiple resolutions passed by the US Assembly gave a specific mandate to the UN Secretary General and his office to create a peace enforcing group of UN soldiers to interpose themselves between both belligerent parties (green line) and to initiate diplomatic efforts which should lead to reconciliation and reunification. From a conflict theory point of view, one could hence classify the Cyprus conflict as consisting of a bilateral conflict (Cyprus-Turkey) mediated by a third party namely the UN Secretary General and influenced by multiple stakeholders (e.g. two remaining guarantor countries Greece and UK, the EU as political supranational umbrella representing Greece, UK, since May 2004 Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) and all the other EU member countries.¹¹

ALLIANCES, NETWORKS, PAYOFFS RELATED TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT.

Figure 1 below gives an overview of the multiple coalitions that have direct or indirect impact on the outcome of any negotiated solution of the Cyprus conflict, if ever achievable at all. Third parties to the conflict can either try to be constructive and help bring about a resolution of the conflict or they might be interested in using the conflict to obtain concessions elsewhere.

Several interest alliances are known to be influential in the region and linked to the Cyprus conflict. On one hand there is configuration of countries tied to each other through various pacts and cooperation agreements ranging from cooperation in the military sector (Turkey, Israel, USA) for example, to alliance against a common enemy or competitor such as Turkey and Israel together against Syria, Lebanon and Iraq (former Saddam Hussein regime).

On the other hand, a very old alliance exists between fellow Christian orthodox countries such as Greece, with Serbia and Russia (formerly Soviet Union) against Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, and Turkey and a strategic alliance going back to the cold war with Syria against Turkey and later on Israel (as an ally of Turkey).

Another link based on common interest and years of active cooperation exists between the UK and the USA. The two bases ceded in perpetuity to UK are used for high tech espionage work covering the near East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus area. The airbase has been used during the Iraq war and is intended to be at service for any other armed conflict situation. A fully reunited and harmonious Cyprus could question the legitimacy of the two bases and even ask the UK to retrocede them to the sovereign country of Cyprus.

¹⁰ Turkish Daily News, Jan. 31, 2002, "General Ozkok defines solution in Cyprus".

¹¹ Fareed Zakaria, "The Fears of America's Steadfast Muslim Ally." Newsweek, 28 January 2002. p.5

The UN secretariat has its own concern and tactical alliances. The Cyprus conflict has meant continuous expenditure, troop presence and fulfilling the mandate to be a conciliator of this old conflict. Having had to face increasing criticism especially from the US and the UK, it is perfectly understandable that the UN SG would like to see an end to the Cyprus conflict. Not to find a solution means continued expenditures that are actually needed elsewhere. Also, not being able to find a solution represents the risk of negative PR with third parties.

The alliance network depicted in Figure 1 is not exhaustive. It solely serves to illustrate the complexity of the Cyprus conflict and the obvious links to other business that countries might have with each other or with other groups and where a solution or the withholding of a solution on the island could be to these third parties best interests but to the detriment of the concerned two communities. A classic case of such opportunistic use of conflicts is for instance the use of veto power by Greece to block internal EU and NATO decision making processes. To opt for a negotiators behaviour called “nuisance factor”, third parties can score points for their protégé (here Greek Cyprus) as well as use their blocking power to bar entry of Turkey to the EU until Turkey e.g. makes concession in other domains.

It is unrealistic to expect a solution to the Cyprus conflict without a simultaneous package deal covering all the additional external conflicts described above. In other words, a solution to the Cyprus conflict necessitates a comprehensive solution covering the Cyprus conflict but also the other stakeholder interests and conflicts now so clearly linked to the Cyprus conflict ¹².


CONFLICT COMPLEXITY IN ACTION: INFLUENCE OF THIRD PARTIES ON MALIGNANT CYPRUS CONFLICT

Cyprus has also been cynically called “the graveyard of well intentioned mediators”. Over the last 32 years, a multitude of peace initiatives have resulted in failure. The list of failed attempts of official and non-official third-party interventions is long (see Diamond & Fisher, 1995; and Dodd, 1998). What follows is the list of the main causes that lead to a failed Track III attempt to bring the two communities together through a so-called confidence-building project. The case itself is described in detail elsewhere (Saner & Yiu, 2002).

The basic idea of the Track III project was to create joint projects in the economic sphere that would offer mutually beneficial incentives to both sides. The proposal was based on the assumption that a Swiss NGO could provide a neutral arena in contrast to the UN auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations who was at different times seen as being biased by either one of the two parties or sometimes by both for different reasons, or to a UK- or US-based NGO because of their affiliation or perceived allegiance to their respective governments who were in fact actively intervening as behind-the scene external stakeholders.

¹² Yesilada & Sozen (2002) for instance offer a very well argued analysis of the Cyprus conflict based on game theory and the prisoner dilemma concept. While such game theoretical perspective offers interesting insights, it is also insufficient since it reduced real complexity of multi-stakeholder interferences to a purely bilateral conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

Constellation of Cyprus Negotiations



The author and his colleagues hence concluded that only a new approach which had not been tried before could succeed—the involvement of both sides’ economic interests in order to develop sufficient common ground for future inter-communal cooperation. What seemed possible was a non-official third-party intervention, which would not jeopardize the ongoing political efforts of the UN. The key to success would be to side-step the political big picture discussions and to focus instead on common economic interests of both communities. If the economic cooperation project succeeded, both sides would gain sufficient confidence to tackle the more complex political issues at a later stage.

In regard to practical steps, the author drafted a project concept and presented it in person to key government officials such as to UN SG’s special envoy for Cyprus in New York, the US State Department, southern European Affairs Office, in Washington, The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London (Cyprus desk), the EU Commission Division DG 1 in charge of EU-Cyprus relations, UNDP resident representative in Cyprus,

the Chambers of Commerce of both sides of the conflict divide, representatives at Greek and Turkish Missions to the UN in Geneva and others more. Switzerland was willing to extend financing for the project under conditions that the UN would welcome the project, support it and that a second country would join the initiative.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE

The project did not become operational for various reasons. It could be said that the time was not ripe for such an inter-communal project since each party involved was still trying to “win,” which by definition was unacceptable to the other party.

From a position of Realpolitik, one could indeed say, “Don’t force cooperation if there is no will to cooperate,”--in other words, the international community should allow the opponents to be separated from each other and to accept the inevitable dividing up of Cyprus into two distinct and independent states. While this seems to be the solution preferred by many Cyprus experts, at the time of the project proposal it did not seem that all efforts were tried yet and that the will towards reconciliation was not yet exhausted. On the contrary, it seemed that the majority of the citizens of both communities favored reconciliation, not separation.

But the main cause for the failure of this Track III project was the multitude of interferences by third parties who influenced the members of both communities according to their own strategic designs leading to paralysis. The paralysis came about because of destructive impact of competition between external and internal parties and institutions who are all stakeholders to the conflict, but who at the same time cannot cooperate among themselves. Their competition often lead to confusion and dangerous instability since they at times tried to manipulate the two side’s officials and populations, while at the same time they also became the victims of manipulations by either sides’ officials and opinion leaders.

The main forms of third party interferences as described in Saner & Yiu (2002) were:

- A) Interferences due to contradictory strategies of key external stakeholders
- B) Interference due to local stakeholder prerogatives
- C) Interference due to historical distrust of main conflicting parties
- D) Interferences due to the use of the “Cyprus card” for secondary gains elsewhere
- E) Interference due to competing agenda of institutional stakeholders: the United Nations Secretariat, the United States of America, the European Union, the United Kingdom
- F) Interferences due to bilateral tensions between Greece and Turkey
- G) Interferences due to competition between local leaders
- H) Interferences due secondary gain of current impasse

PRESSURE TACTICS BY THIRD PARTIES TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: RECENT EXAMPLES

What follows are two examples of third parties interferences, which occurred over the last three years. The first example is the pressure tactic, which was used by the UN in close cooperation with the EU, the USA and the UK during the build up to the EU membership date of Cyprus. The second example gives an example of Turkish pressure tactics during

the delicate phase of last minute negotiation at the Bürgenstock, which ultimately sealed the resistance of the Greek Cypriot leadership against the Annan plan.

Annan V

The Annan plan for Cyprus in fact evolved over time starting with Annan I (11th October, 2002), moving to Annan II (10th December 2002) on to Annan III (8th March, 2003). Annan IV was a short lived trial version before the final Annan V (31st March, 2004)¹³ which was presented to the public a few days before the referendum took place in both communities consisting of several thousands of pages. Based on the limited access to documented texts, it appears that the UN team in unison with the EU, USA and UK delegations hoped to accommodate Denktash's objections by progressively adding concessions to the benefit of the Denktash position and to the detriment of the Greek Cypriot position. At the same time, the UN team in unison with the EU Commission and the USA, UK assumed that presenting the Greek Cypriot side with a last minute complex deal a few days before the referendum and four weeks before official acceptance as EU member would be too much to reject for the Southern Cypriot leadership and people.

The opposite was the case. The negotiation behavior of the UN and the three big power were seen as "take it or leave it" pressure on a subject matter that was too crucial for both communities future. Too much was at stake than to almost blindly trust that the complicated text would be in the interest of the Greek community. Holding a quasi monopoly in the official media, President Papadopoulos was easily able to highlight the negative aspects of the deal while downplaying the potential benefits. When under pressure and facing uncertainty, most people reject experiments which they cannot control or whose implications they cannot anticipate. Adding to this uncertainty came anger when it became known that the Turkish settlers would be allowed to vote in contrast to a comparable vote in East Timor where Indonesian settlers were not allowed to vote during the crucial vote on independence of East Timor.¹⁴¹⁵

Ambassador Ziyal's "final points"

Another example of high pressure of time and demands was the famous by now famous list of 11 points presented by Ambassador Ziyal on 26th March at the beginning of the Bürgenstock meeting which was attended by the Presidents of Turkey, Greece, Cyprus (Greek Cypriot), the UN Secretary General, Colin Powell and other world leaders. However, Mr Denktash opted to stay at home and to be replaced by Mr. Talat, then holding

¹³ For detailed analysis of how the four Annan proposals evolved over time see Claire Palley (2005), "An international Relations Debacle: The UN SG's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004", Hart Publ., Oxford, pp-275-314.

¹⁴ Evriviades, E., Ambassador of Cyprus to the USA (2005) "Cyprus in the EU: Once Year later- Prospects for Reunification", American Hellenic Institute, Washington, 23 May 2005, p.5

¹⁵ For many scholars following the Cyprus conflict, it was a surprise that the EU would allow membership of a country which did not have full control of its territory. It was however often insinuated that without Cyprus being given EU membership status, Greece would not have agreed to NATO enlargement.

the function of Prime Minister of the TRNC and his son Serdar Denktash in the role of TRNC Minister of Foreign Affairs. The absence of Denktash, then still president of the TRNC, a leading figure of the Cyprus conflict, should have been sufficient reason to cancel the Būrgenstock meeting which went ahead anyway for reasons suggested in previous section.

Being absent from the meeting, Denktash did not have to submit to pressure nor extend any concessions. His son and Mr. Talat's mandate for negotiations and possible give-and-take concession making being seriously limited, there was not much hope for the Greek Cypriots to be able to trade concessions. To this one-sided situation comes the sudden presentation of 11 "final points" of Turkey presented by Ambassador Ziyal to the UN and addressed to the Greek Cypriot representatives – again, the pressure of a last minute surprise demand. Alike the Annan V "last minute proposal." The eleven points consisted of the following: ¹⁶

1. The percentage of the Greek Cypriots returning to the North should be reduced from 21% to 18%. This percentage is the least we can accept.
2. The Turkish Cypriot proposal regarding the property issue (1/3) should be accepted.
3. Bi-Communal/bi-national configurations, such as 24 Turkish Cypriot and 24 Greek Cypriot Senators should be properly reflected in the Plan.
4. The restriction of 55 to be applied to the Turkish citizens to establish residence in Cyprus even after Turkey's accession to the EU should be lifted.
5. Inclusion in the Plan of the understanding of neither side claiming jurisdiction and authority over the other side.
6. The individual applications of the Greek Cypriots to the ECHR, including the ones on the loss of use should not be encouraged. The United Cyprus Republic should be the sole responsible addressee for these cases.
7. Our expectations regarding the security and guarantees should be fully met.
8. Preservation of Greek and Turkish military presence on the Island even after the accession of Turkey to the European Union. (The contingents provided by the treaty of Alliance should be maintained.
9. Measures should be developed for effective preservation of bi-zonality
10. Turkish Cypriot citizens originating from Anatolia should not be discriminated against within the framework of a comprehensive settlement.

DISCUSSIONS OF RECENT EXAMPLES OF INTERFERENCES

Both examples of interventions by external parties shed light on the complex situation of the Cyprus conflicts. Gaining a point, even if beneficial on first sight for the ally, here Northern Cyprus, means often times scoring a point at home or signalling a message to third, fourth, fifth level parties outside the immediate Cyprus conflict "zone."

Taking for example the tough stance of Turkey during the Būrgenstock negotiation, one can also imagine that scoring points there was equal to getting points at home in Turkey and getting messages across to friends and enemies as well. Some of the motivations behind Turkey's tough stance might be related to the following concerns.

Turkey has been working hard on making political and economic reforms required for EU membership. It passed the hurdle of being accepted as EU candidate only in 2004.

¹⁶ Claire Palley (2005), p. Z.9, and pp 128-129 describing how many of points were accommodated by the UN team as reported from a pro Greek Cypriot perspective.

With Cyprus (Southern Cyprus) having become an EU member in May 2004, Turkey faces a situation whereby its own future EU membership application could be vetoed by Southern Cyprus since EU membership decisions are taken by consensus. Southern Cyprus as new EU member could hence block Turkey's EU ambitions indefinitely, an unacceptable possibility for Turkey's political and economic leadership.

At the same time, the US government's anti-terrorist campaign and remodelling of post-Saddam Iraq is resulting in increasing pressure on Turkey to cooperate. Such an eventuality worries Turkish leaders since the defeat of Saddam has rekindled hopes in the Kurdish held territories of an independent Kurdish state in the northern part of Iraq. Turkish political and military leaders fear such an eventuality: An independent Kurdish state might re-ignite Kurdish rebellion in Turkey and even more worrisome might lead to new calls for Kurdish separation from Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey does not want to be seen as obstructing the US campaign against "evil powers."

Tensions are further kept high due to the continued threat of Southern Cyprus to install the S-300 PMU-1 Missile System bought from Russia which, if installed on the island, would alter the current military balance and possibly threatening Turkish airspace including parts of Turkey inhabited by its Kurdish minority unhappy with its status and treatment is the majority Turkish government. Southern Cypriot authorities promised to withhold the installation of the missile system but not to relinquish its right to do so at a later stage.

All this is of course not helped by recent statements of the Turkish Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Ozkok who declared in his new-year statement that Turkey should be "defending our rights and interests on Cyprus, which constitutes the cornerstone of our security in the Eastern Mediterranean."¹⁷

CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this chapter was to shed light on the impact of external stakeholders' interferences on a protracted conflict, in this case the Cyprus conflict. The impact of persistent interference by external stakeholders is a topic, which has not received sufficient exposure in the conflict literature so far. The objective of this article was hence to illustrate such third party interference in the case of the long-lasting Cyprus conflict and to describe the diverse forms of interferences used by the third parties and how these multiple interferences have turned the Cyprus conflict into a malignant conflict seemingly intractable to solve as long as third party interests remain high and secondary gains too important to maintain for business elsewhere.

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¹⁷ General Ozok : Defending our interests in Cyprus constitutes the cornerstone of our security in Eastern Mediterranean, excerpts of speech given by General Ozkok, www.hri.org/cyprus/tcpr/2006/06-01-02.tcpr.html

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